



STRIDER

FROM INNOVATION TO WEAPONIZATION

How China Exploits the Australian &
New Zealand Open Scientific Systems






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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is executing a state-driven strategy to achieve global leadership in science and technology (S&T). Government plans lay out tactics for achieving that goal, including leveraging international collaborations and recruiting foreign talent. While many PRC organisations are tasked with implementing those tactics, research institutes affiliated with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) - organisations conducting research and development (R&D) or production on behalf of the PRC's armed services - pose the most significant risks to Australia's and New Zealand's national security and S&T ecosystems.

In response to the threat posed by the PRC's strategy, the Australian and New Zealand governments have taken steps to safeguard the integrity of their innovation and research ecosystems. Recent initiatives by both nations - such as the establishment of the University Foreign Interference Taskforce (UFIT) in Australia and the issuance of trusted research guidelines and information on foreign interference by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) - reflect a growing recognition of the threats posed by foreign state-linked research activity.

Strider identified STEM publications that feature collaboration between Australian and New Zealand organisations and more than 50 PLA-affiliated research institutes (PLA-RIs) - spanning military research bodies, state-owned defence conglomerates, and 'Seven Sons of National Defence' universities.

Our Findings Include:

6K

Since 2020, Strider identified more than 80 Australian organisations that have collaborated with a PLA-RI on more than 6,000 STEM publications.

500+


Since 2020, Strider identified more than 10 New Zealand organisations that have collaborated with a PLA-RI on more than 500 STEM publications.



Topics of collaboration include strategic dual-use technologies such as artificial intelligence and aerospace systems, as well as technology with a higher likelihood of military applications such as communication jamming, target tracking, and unmanned underwater vehicles.

This report concludes by recommending that Australian and New Zealand organisations should eliminate STEM research collaboration with PLA-RIs. Appendix I provides detailed methodology and Appendix II provides brief profiles of select PLA-RIs.





INTRODUCTION

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is pursuing a national strategy to position itself as a global leader in science and technology (S&T). General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasised the priorities of 'achieving high-level S&T self-reliance,' 'resolutely winning the battle over key core technologies,' and building a 'world-class military.'

A range of PRC entities are involved in implementing this strategy, including research institutes affiliated with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). These organisations are tasked with advancing the military's capabilities and play a central role in executing state-directed S&T objectives.

Australia's and New Zealand's defence and innovation ecosystems are increasingly intertwined with academia, a reliance both governments explicitly acknowledge. Australia's 2024 Defence Innovation, Science and Technology Strategy outlines a 10-year vision built on close collaboration between defence, industry, and academia to integrate technological advancements that deliver superior capabilities to the Australian Defence Force. New Zealand has similarly signalled growing investment in defence-linked research and technology partnerships.

As Strider's analysis shows, the PRC leverages international scientific partnerships, including with leading Australian and New Zealand universities, to access sensitive dual-use research, recruit talent, and advance the technological capabilities of the PLA.

China's industrial policies outline specific mechanisms for advancing these ambitions, including:



Expanding international research collaborations with leading global institutions



Recruiting top-tier foreign talent to relocate to China





AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY RESPONSE

Australia's research landscape has been shaped by rapid growth in international collaboration, including a significant shift in research partnerships. The PRC has now overtaken the United States as Australia's largest research partner in terms of co-authored scientific publications. Chinese collaborators are now listed on a larger share of Australian research outputs than collaborators from any other single country. This reflects a broader trend in global science, where China's research institutions have expanded their footprint and influence across key technology areas, raising questions for policymakers about balancing collaboration with national security imperatives.

Recognising the national security threat posed by the PRC's strategy, the Australian government has taken action to mitigate the risk and restrict PRC military and strategic entities from exploiting the openness of the Australian research and innovation ecosystem. These efforts are part of a strategy to prevent illicit technology transfer and foreign government influence.



University Foreign Interference Taskforce (UFIT) Guidelines:

In 2019, the Australian government, in partnership with the university sector, established the University Foreign Interference Taskforce to address the risks posed by foreign interference in the tertiary education system. The resulting Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian University Sector were updated in 2021 with the stated objective of providing additional guidance to help universities assess risk in their global engagements and safeguard their people, data, and research. The updated guidelines emphasise the importance of robust governance frameworks and increased cooperation between universities, government departments, and national security agencies.





Australian Research Council (ARC):

The Australian Research Council plays a central role in shaping the country's research ecosystem. ARC grants are awarded through a peer-review process conducted by academic experts and recommended to the Federal Minister for Education, offering insight into which research areas and international collaborations the government is willing to support. The Australian government has explicitly ruled that public funds cannot be used to support research that may endanger national security, signalling a more cautious approach to funding decisions in sensitive research domains. As a result, ARC funding for STEMM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Maths, and Medical) projects involving Australian and Chinese collaborators has declined since 2019, reflecting heightened government concern regarding the national security risks posed by the PRC.



Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024:

In 2024, Australia strengthened its legal framework for protecting sensitive technology and information through the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act. The legislation is intended to ensure the safeguarding of Australian technologies and research outputs, as well as those of key international partners, by tightening controls on the transfer of defence and dual-use technologies. The legislation seeks to strike a balance between protecting Australia's national security and supporting economic prosperity and research collaboration.



Export Controls:

Australian university researchers are also subject to export control requirements designed to prevent the unauthorised transfer of sensitive technology and knowledge. Under Australia's export control regime, researchers must seek government approval before sharing or publishing certain military or 'dual-use' technologies - research with both civilian and military applications, such as radar, advanced sensing systems, aerospace technologies, and secure communications. These controls are intended to limit the dissemination of sensitive capabilities to foreign actors and to protect Australia's national security interests while preserving academic collaboration.



NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT POLICY RESPONSE

The New Zealand government has increasingly recognised the national security risks associated with foreign interference and the exploitation of its research and academic ecosystem. In recent years, New Zealand's principal security agencies have publicly emphasised that foreign interference — especially by the PRC — poses a threat to national interests and have sought to build protective frameworks to help institutions mitigate those risks.



NZSIS and National Security Priorities:

Since 2018, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) have been charged by Cabinet with monitoring and addressing foreign interference as part of the National Security and Intelligence Priorities. The NZSIS has warned that a range of foreign states seek to influence or exploit New Zealand organisations and information, including technology and research, as part of broader geopolitical competition and economic espionage.



Trusted Research - Protective Security Requirements (TR-PSR):

The NZSIS has become increasingly focused on academic collaborations with foreign universities involving research that could be used for military purposes. Universities New Zealand-Te Pūkai Tara — the body representing New Zealand's eight universities — partnered with the government to develop guidance to help

universities identify, assess, and manage foreign influence risks in international research engagements. The guidance emphasises that joint research can be misused by organisations whose interests and ethical frameworks differ from New Zealand's, potentially providing opportunities for hostile actors to gain access to expertise, systems, or data.



Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Act 2025:

In November 2025, New Zealand's Parliament passed the Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Act 2025, strengthening the country's criminal justice response to foreign interference and espionage. The legislation added new offences to the Crimes Act 1961 and modified existing offences related to espionage and the wrongful communication, retention, or copying of government information. This is part of a wider cross-government work program intended to counter foreign interference from any country, including in academic and research settings.



STRIDER DATA FINDINGS

Scale of Australian & New Zealand Collaboration with PLA-RIs

Since 2020, Strider identified:

6K

More than 80 Australian organisations that have collaborated with a PLA-RI on more than 6,000 STEM publications.

500+

More than 10 New Zealand organisations that have collaborated with a PLA-RI on more than 500 STEM publications.


Among the Australian and New Zealand organisations that have the most instances of collaboration with PLA-RIs are leading universities and government laboratories. Australian and New Zealand companies that appear in the dataset have significantly lower levels of collaboration than their academic and government counterparts.




Research Collaboration Over Time

The number of joint publications between PLA-RIs and Australian and New Zealand organisations has remained relatively steady since 2020 despite increased awareness about the threats posed to research security and government initiatives. The 2025 publication count appears lower than reality because there is a lag in publication reporting.

Number of Publications Featuring Collaboration Between AUS Orgs and PLA-RIs



Number of Publications Featuring Collaboration Between NZ Orgs and PLA-RIs



Note: The publication data used in this analysis reflects an inherent lag from real time. Open-source academic and scientific databases are updated only after research passes through multiple stages of the publication and indexing process. Articles often experience a delay between submission, acceptance, and formal publication, and indexing services require additional time to validate and integrate new records. Some publishers also release metadata in batches or impose embargo periods before making information publicly accessible. As a result, publication counts for 2025 (using data available through August 2025) should be interpreted with caution, as it likely underrepresents the true level of research activity rather than indicating a substantive decline.



Australia Research Collaboration Topics and Technologies

Much of the joint research Strider identified in this analysis involves dual-use technologies - areas of science and engineering with both civilian and military applications. Notably, some of this research involves technologies with a high likelihood of direct military utility, which may contribute to the PRC's offensive and defensive capabilities. While this report does not provide an exhaustive analysis of all related military technologies, the following examples illustrate key areas of concern.



Covert Wireless Communication Through Probabilistic Jamming:

A 2025 joint publication by researchers from the Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA, the PLA Army Engineering University, and an Australian university presents a covert communication framework based on probabilistic artificial-noise jamming. The study proposes a scheme to reduce the likelihood of detection while maintaining reliable communication under covertness constraints. Civilian applications include secure privacy-sensitive networks and next-generation mobile infrastructure. Militarily, the probabilistic jamming approach directly supports low-probability-of-detection and low-probability-of-intercept communications, strengthening survivable command-and-control links, unmanned system coordination, and electronic warfare resilience. The collaboration between the two PLA-affiliated institutes and the Australian university highlights dual-use advances in covert transmission optimisation, aligning with the PRC's broader efforts to enhance spectrum dominance and adaptive electronic warfare capabilities.



UUV Target Tracking Method Based on High-Order CGHF Algorithm:

A collaborative study involving Harbin Engineering University, a Seven Sons of National Defence university, and an Australian university advances underwater target-tracking techniques for unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) using a high-order Cubature Gauss-Helmert Filter (CGHF) algorithm. The research improves tracking accuracy in nonlinear sonar environments. Civilian applications include enhanced subsea monitoring, offshore infrastructure inspection, and autonomous oceanographic survey systems. The research has strong military applications in improving nonlinear tracking algorithms to directly support anti-submarine warfare, seabed surveillance, and precision navigation for unmanned naval platforms.



Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Systems:

A 2025 collaborative study involving researchers from Beijing Institute of Technology, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), and two Australian universities develops a hierarchical control framework for heterogeneous multi-agent systems. The work enables diverse agents to achieve rapid consensus and stable trajectory tracking in finite time. The civilian applications of this research include coordinated autonomous vehicles, intelligent transportation systems, and distributed robotics in dynamic environments. Militarily, the approach supports control of unmanned swarms, air and missile defence networks, and distributed aerospace platforms requiring fast, reliable coordination under complex command hierarchies. CASIC's direct role as a major PRC defence contractor, deeply involved in missile systems, aerospace platforms, and defence electronics, introduces elevated strategic and technology-transfer risks, particularly in the context of swarm-enabled precision strike and integrated air-defence architectures.



New Zealand Research Collaboration Topics and Technologies



Hybrid Kalman Filter Correction for Navigation:

A 2025 study co-authored by researchers from Harbin Engineering University's National Key Laboratory of Underwater Acoustic Technology and a New Zealand university proposes a hybrid correction method for integrated navigation using a convergence-factor-based Kalman filter. Civilian applications include more reliable navigation for autonomous underwater vehicles and offshore operations. Militarily, enhanced Kalman filter fusion of inertial and Doppler data supports precise navigation for submarines and unmanned undersea platforms in GPS-denied conditions, reinforcing the dual-use significance of advanced state-estimation techniques in maritime systems.

PLA-RI Collaboration with Australian Organisations (Since 2020)

PLA-Affiliated Research Institute Publications

Harbin Institute of Technology	1,151
Beijing Institute of Technology	878
Northwestern Polytechnical University	866
Beihang University	839
Nanjing University of Science and Technology	703
Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics	493
Harbin Engineering University	313
PLA National University of Defence Technology	158
North University of China	106
PLA Army Medical University	90

PLA-RI Collaboration with New Zealand Organisations (Since 2020)

PLA-Affiliated Research Institute Publications

Beijing Institute of Technology	118
Harbin Institute of Technology	99
Northwestern Polytechnical University	98
Beihang University	79
Nanjing University of Science and Technology	41
Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics	36
PLA National University of Defence Technology	30
Harbin Engineering University	16
PLA Air Force Medical University	14
China Academy of Engineering Physics	12



CONCLUSION

The findings of this report underscore a pressing and persistent challenge to the integrity and security of the Australian and New Zealand S&T ecosystems. Despite multiple rounds of policy interventions by both governments, research collaboration between Australia- and New Zealand-based organisations and PLA-affiliated research institutes has continued at significant levels. These collaborations - many of which involve dual-use and military technologies like communication jamming, target tracking, and unmanned underwater vehicles - pose strategic risks that extend far beyond academia. They contribute directly and indirectly to the advancement of the PRC's military capabilities and its broader geopolitical ambitions.

This report's data highlights a disturbing trend: since 2020, 80 Australian organisations have collaborated with a PLA-RI on more than 6,000 STEM publications and 10 New Zealand organisations have collaborated with a PLA-RI on more than 500 STEM publications. This engagement not only facilitates potential illicit knowledge transfer but also supports the PRC's state-directed efforts to recruit top international talent, often to the detriment of Australian and New Zealand national interests. Despite government action by both nations to raise awareness and mitigate research security risks, the openness of their research environment continues to be exploited.



Ultimately, safeguarding Australian and New Zealand research ecosystems will require more than government encouragement to conduct due diligence. Clearer policy direction and stronger enforcement mechanisms—alongside more robust research security frameworks across universities, government laboratories, and private sector—will be critical to managing collaboration-related risk.

Limiting partnerships with PRC research institutions linked to the PLA represents one practical step toward reducing exposure while preserving the integrity of international scientific collaboration. Such measures can help ensure that innovations emerging from Australian and New Zealand research institutions support open scientific progress rather than contributing to the advancement of foreign military capabilities.

For sourcing information or more insight into information detailed in this report and Strider's tools, reach out to our team via email at info@striderintel.com.



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This analysis was conducted using programmatic matching algorithms supplemented by human quality control measures. In datasets of this size, there is a chance of inaccuracy. Additional details, validation, and specific source documents can be provided upon request.



APPENDIX I: STRIDER METHODOLOGY

Strider identified all instances of research collaboration on STEM topics between PLA-RIs and Australian and New Zealand organisations. Methodology and definitions for key concepts used in this report are below.

PLA-affiliated Research Institutes: ‘People’s Liberation Army-affiliated Research Institutes (PLA-RIs)’ are defined as more than fifty institutions based in the PRC that do R&D or production on behalf of the PRC’s armed services. The more than fifty PLA-RIs fall into one of the following three organisation categories. Further details and examples of organisations within each category are provided in Appendix II.

- **PLA Research Institutes** are subordinate to the PRC Central Military Commission and support the military’s R&D efforts in biomedical and defence technology research.
- **State-owned Arms Conglomerates** are major commercial enterprises owned by the PRC central government that develop and build weapons systems for the PLA.
- **Seven Sons of National Defense** are a group of PRC universities that hold top-secret credentials and close R&D relationships with the PLA and the PRC’s defence industry.

Research Collaboration: ‘Research collaboration’ is defined as the co-authorship of an academic paper involving at least one author affiliated with a PLA-RI and at least one author from an Australian or New Zealand organisation. In general, research collaboration on academic papers can take many forms. Some cases involve extensive, hands-on engagement, in-person meetings, the exchange of ideas and information, joint experimentation, and even co-development of software or hardware prototypes. In other cases, interaction may be minimal, with co-authors never meeting and contributing isolated sections to a paper compiled by a lead author.

To account for this variability, we limited our analysis to publications with fewer than twenty authors. While not a perfect filter, this threshold helps exclude large-scale publications where meaningful collaboration is less likely. Regardless of the depth of engagement, co-authorship itself is a known tactic employed by the PRC government and, at a minimum, reflects a shared point of contact between listed authors.

STEM Topics: Analysis for this report was limited to scientific publications on STEM topics including Physics, Engineering, Materials Science, Computer Science, Chemistry, Mathematics, Biology, Medicine, and Geology.



APPENDIX II: PLA-RI DESCRIPTIONS

As noted in Appendix I, Strider defines PLA-RIs as a set of more than 50 institutions that conduct R&D or production on behalf of the PRC's armed services - including PLA Research Institutes, State-owned Arms Conglomerates, and Seven Sons of National Defence universities. While some of these institutes are more directly supporting military technology development than others, all have close document ties to the military. This appendix provides brief profiles of a sample of the institutes that fall under each category.

PLA Research Institutes

- **Army Medical University** (中国人民解放军陆军军医大学), formerly known as the Third Military Medical University, is affiliated with the PLA Ground Force. It includes six national laboratories and has won military awards for S&T progress. The Army Medical University collaborates with and supplies research and technology to defence and military organisations.
- **Chinese People's Liberation Army General Hospital** (中国人民解放军总医院) is a deputy military-level unit directly under the Joint Logistics Support Force of the Central Military Commission and headed by a Major General of the PLA. It serves as the PLA's medical college and scientific research base.
- **Nanjing General Hospital of Nanjing Military Command** (中国人民解放军南京总医院) is a military medical hospital that is responsible for human resource training for the PLA and Nanjing Military Command health professionals. The hospital engages in a range of military research and talent recruitment activities.
- **The PLA National University of Defence Technology** (NUDT, 中国人民解放军国防科学技术大学) is a military R&D institute subordinate to the Central Military Commission of the CCP. NUDT's President is a Major General in the PLA. NUDT is under US government sanction because it poses a risk to national security.
- **The PLA Air Force Medical University**, also known as the Fourth Military Medical University (第四军医大学唐都医院) is a PLA research institution for medical and psychological sciences. The university specialises in military preventative

medicine and medical and psychological sciences tailored for personnel engaging in air and space operations. It employs several talent program selectees.

State-owned Arms Conglomerates

- **China Academy of Space Technology** (CAST, 中国空间技术研究院) is a PRC research institute focused on R&D for outer space technologies. CAST is subordinate to the China Aerospace Science and Technology Company (CASC), a PRC state-owned defence aerospace conglomerate active in the international arms export market.
- **China Institute of Atomic Energy** (中国原子能科学研究院) is a PRC nuclear research institute under the China National Nuclear Corporation, a PRC state-owned nuclear technology company that has close ties to the PRC defence sector. The Institute has supported the development of ballistic missiles and has received awards for its contributions to national defence science and technology.
- **China Electronics Technology Group Corporation** (CETC, 中国电子科技集团公司) is a state-owned defence conglomerate that specialises in dual-use electronics. CETC is charged with 'maintaining self-reliance, coordinating battle' and 'guaranteeing national defence and military electronic information equipment research.' CETC researches and produces early warning, radar, electronic warfare, communication and navigation, and unmanned aerial vehicle systems. CETC and many of its subsidiaries are sanctioned by the US government.



- **Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China** (COMAC, 中国商用飞机有限责任公司) is a state-owned manufacturer of commercial aircraft that the PRC government refers to as a 'defence industry conglomerate.' COMAC maintains strong links to the defence industry and its leadership is drawn from former executives of state-owned military aircraft and missile manufacturers. The PRC's primary supplier of military aircraft, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, holds a 10% share in COMCAC.
- **Southwestern Institute of Physics** (核工业西南物理研究院) is a PRC nuclear fusion research institute under China National Nuclear Corporation, a PRC state-owned nuclear technology company.

Seven Sons of National Defense

The 'Seven Sons' are a group of PRC universities subordinate to the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND), a PRC government agency responsible for defence S&T policy. The Seven Sons have deep ties to the defence industry and military through their defence laboratories, talent development, and collaboration with defence arms conglomerates. The Seven Sons all house 'talent introduction bases' that aim to 'introduce overseas talents and enhance the level of foreign intelligence,' as well as 'advance indigenous innovation capabilities' of the country. The Seven Sons hold top-secret security credentials and are all sanctioned by the US and Japanese governments.

- **Beihang University**, also known as Beijing University of Aerospace and Aeronautics (BUAA, 北京航空航天大学) is a Seven Sons university that specialises in spaceflight research and is a leader in stealth technology. It is involved in the R&D for PRC military aircraft and missiles and sends many of its graduates to state-owned missile and defence aviation companies. BUAA hosts at least eight major defence laboratories.
- **Beijing Institute of Technology** (BIT, 北京理工大学) is a Seven Sons university that is a leader in weapons sciences. It is one of a few PRC institutions to award doctorates in weapons science. About 30% of its graduates work in the defence sector, and it hosts at least ten defence laboratories. BIT claims to conduct world-class research on missile technology, including 'precision strikes, high damage efficiency, manoeuvre penetration, long-range suppression, and

military communications systems.' BIT is the chair of the B8 Cooperation Innovation Alliance, a group of universities that collaborate with China North Industries Group Corporation (a state-owned producer of armaments) and the Chinese Academy of Ordnance Science (a government R&D institute) to advance the PRC's national defence S&T goals.

- **Harbin Engineering University** (HEU, 哈尔滨工程大学) is a Seven Sons university that hosts PRC state research centres and key laboratories and cooperates with multiple state military-industrial entities, including the China National Nuclear Corporation and the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics, the country's primary nuclear weapons developer. HEU was added to the US Commerce Department's Entity List in June 2020 'for acquiring and attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of programs for the People's Liberation Army.'
- **Harbin Institute of Technology** (HIT, 哈尔滨工业大学) is a Seven Sons university described by PRC state media as having 'defence technology innovation and weapons and armaments modernization as its core.' HIT is best known for aerospace research and operates a joint research centre with China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, a state-owned defence company that specialises in long-range ballistic missile and satellite technology. HIT spends about half its budget on defence research and about 30% of its graduates go on to work in the defence sector. HIT hosts at least nine major defence laboratories. HIT is included on Japan's End User list for export controls.
- **Nanjing University of Science and Technology** (NJUST, 南京理工大学) is a Seven Sons university that ranks among the top PRC universities for armaments sciences. About 15% of its graduates find employment in the defence sector, and it has a collaborative relationship with the PRC military in fields such as signals intelligence, unmanned combat platforms, and information security. NJUST traces its origins to the PLA Military Engineering College's Department of Artillery Engineering. NJUST is a member of the B8 Cooperation Innovation Alliance, a group of universities that collaborate with China North Industries Group Corporation (a state-owned producer of armaments) and the Chinese Academy of Ordnance Science (a government R&D institute) to advance the PRC's national defence S&T goals.



- **Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics** (NUAA, 南京航空航天大学) is a Seven Sons university that specialises in aerospace research and works closely with PRC military aviation companies. Scientists at the NUAA College of Energy and Power Engineering sit on expert panels for the PLA. In 2018, 21% of the university's graduates who found employment were working in the defence sector. The university claims to have participated in nearly all major national aviation projects, including the development of the Chang'e 3 unmanned lunar explorer. NUAA also hosts the PRC's only national defence laboratory for helicopter technology. In 2021, the United States convicted PRC intelligence officer XU Yanjun of conspiring and attempting to steal engine technology from GE Aviation. The indictment details the involvement of a NUAA deputy director in those efforts.
- **Northwestern Polytechnical University** (NWPU, 西北工业大学) is a Seven Sons university that describes itself as 'devoted to improving and serving the national defence science and technology industry.' NWPU has close ties to state-owned shipbuilding and aerospace conglomerates and, through a subsidiary company, produces 90% of the PRC's military drones. About 40% of its graduates go on to work in the defence sector. In 2018, the US Department of Justice charged PRC national Shuren QIN with illegally exporting devices used in anti-submarine warfare to NWPU.

